Learning the Form of Causal Relationships Using Hierarchical Bayesian Models

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Abstract

People learn quickly when reasoning about causal relationships, making inferences from limited data and avoiding spurious inferences. Efficient learning depends on abstract knowledge, which is often domain or context specific, and much of it must be learned. While such knowledge effects are well documented, little is known about exactly how we acquire knowledge that constrains learning. This work focuses on knowledge of the functional form of causal relationships; there are many kinds of relationships that can apply between causes and their effects, and knowledge of the form such a relationship takes is important in order to quickly identify the real causes of an observed effect. We developed a hierarchical Bayesian model of the acquisition of knowledge of the functional form of causal relationships and tested it in five experimental studies, considering disjunctive and conjunctive relationships, failure rates, and cross-domain effects. The Bayesian model accurately predicted human judgments and outperformed several alternative models.

Keywords: Causal reasoning; Bayesian networks; Bayesian models; Hierarchical models; Rational inference; Structure learning; Human experimentation; Computer simulation

1. Introduction

Causal inference—learning what causal relationships are present in the world by observing events—is often taken to rely primarily on universal cues such as spatiotemporal contingency or reliable covariation between effects and their prospective causes (Hume, 1748). While recognizing covariation may be central to causal learning, there is both experimental and intuitive support for the idea that people also use domain-specific knowledge. For instance, children come to conclusions that they would not be able to

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reach if they were ignorant about the mechanisms behind causal relationships, as shown by experiments where they pick mechanistically plausible causes over spatially and temporally contingent ones (Shultz, 1982) or prefer mechanical causes for mechanical effects except when physical constraints make such a relationship unrealistic (Bullock, Gelman, & Baillargeon, 1982). There is also evidence that this kind of knowledge is learned. For example, children use mechanism knowledge differently as they age, with older children showing an understanding of a broader range of mechanisms (Bullock et al., 1982; Shultz, 1982).

Despite these indications that prior knowledge plays a role in causal learning, popular accounts of causal learning frame prior knowledge as orthogonal to (e.g., Cheng, 1997) or incompatible with (e.g., Ahn, Kalish, Medin, & Gelman, 1995; Shultz, 1982) statistical information provided by covariation between causes and effects. Even accounts that accept that knowledge about mechanisms, domains, and categories need to be combined with covariation information tend not to provide for how we acquire such knowledge (e.g., Waldmann, 1996). The topic has not been ignored, however: In recent years some studies have explicitly considered the interplay of abstract knowledge and statistical information, examining how knowledge about categories and the nature of causal relationships affect the conclusions people draw from covariational evidence (Kemp, Goodman, & Tenenbaum, 2007; Lien & Cheng, 2000; Waldmann, 2007).

In this paper, we present a framework that reconciles covariation-based inference with acquired knowledge about kinds of causal relationships. Our goal was to explain how children and adults extract abstract information about causal relationships from experience and use this information to guide causal learning. We focus here on knowledge about the *functional form* of causal relationships—the nature of the relationship between causes and effects—and specifically on how causes interact in producing their effects. For example, imagine a light and two switches. Each switch is connected to the light, and affects whether the light is on or off. However, there are a variety of ways in which the light and the switches could be connected: The light might only turn on when both switches are pressed, or turn on when either is pressed, or turn on only some of the time when either switch is pressed but more often when both are pressed. Similar possibilities hold for other causal systems, with causes either acting independently or in conjunction to bring about or prevent effects. If learners know how causes influence effects in a particular kind of causal system, they can use this information to inform their reasoning about the existence of causal relationships.

Our perspective on how people acquire and use knowledge about the functional form of causal relationships follows in the spirit of rational analysis (Anderson, 1990) and previous accounts of causal inference (Cheng, 1997): We are concerned with clearly specifying the underlying computational problem and comparing human inferences to the optimal solution to this problem. We take the basic challenge of causal induction to be acquiring rich, useful representations of cause and effect that can be represented using *causal graphical models* (Pearl, 2000; Spirtes, Glymour, & Schienes, 1993), a formal language for representing causal relationships, which we describe in more detail below. This formal language allows us to clearly characterize the role that functional form plays in causal learning, and to

develop a mathematical framework in which we can analyze how knowledge of functional form is acquired and used.

We make two contributions toward understanding how people combine prior knowledge and covariational evidence in causal induction. Our first contribution is showing that the problem of learning the functional form of a causal relationship can be formalized using *hierarchical Bayesian models*, in which information about causal relationships is maintained at multiple levels of abstraction, reflecting both hypotheses about which causal relationships exist among specific sets of variables and more general theories about how causes relate to their effects. This general approach is compatible with other recent work on the acquisition of causal knowledge (Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2007; Tenenbaum & Niyogi, 2003) and can be applied to phenomena beyond those we consider explicitly. Our second contribution is a series of experiments that test the qualitative predictions made by this approach, as well as the quantitative predictions made by a specific hierarchical Bayesian model. Our experiments focus on learning about a specific kind of causal system, related to the ''blicket detector'' used in previous work on causal learning (Gopnik & Sobel, 2000; Sobel et al., 2004). We use this system to explore acquisition and use of abstract knowledge about functional form when the causal structure is specified, as well as when it is learned from contingency data. We also show that the scope of this knowledge seems to be restricted to the domain in which it is learned.

The plan of the paper is as follows. The next section reviews previous experiments that have explored the learning and use of knowledge of functional form. We then summarize standard accounts of how people infer causal relationships from statistical evidence and consider the role they provide for abstract knowledge. We go on to outline the hierarchical Bayesian approach to analyzing the role of knowledge in causal induction and indicate how this approach applies to functional form. This is followed by a series of experiments that test the predictions of our model, revealing some sources of information that people use and kinds of knowledge they acquire. We conclude by discussing related models and considering new questions we hope to answer with this line of work.

2. Using knowledge of functional form in causal induction

Most previous work on the effects of prior knowledge on causal induction has focused on factors such as the plausibility of a causal relationship (Alloy & Tabachnik, 1984; Koslowski, 1996) and the types of entities in a domain (Lien & Cheng, 2000). However, three studies have explicitly looked at how people learn and use information about the form of causal relationships.

Zelazo and Shultz (1989) tested the ability of adults to predict the magnitude of an effect as a function of two causal variables and found that their inferences depended on the form of the relationship indicated by the physical system. Specifically, when asked to learn from two training events and predict how far a counter-weighted balance would tilt or an obstructed set of blocks would slide, people tended to make inferences consistent with the dynamics of the specific physical system involved. By contrast, Zelazo and Shultz found

that 9 year olds' inferences reflected an understanding that the magnitude of the effect increased with the size of one block and decreased with the size of the other but did not capture the differences between specific forms of the two relationships. One interpretation of this developmental difference is that adults had more experience with the two causal systems and were thus able to make more precise inferences from the training events.

Waldmann (2007) also found that knowledge of the form of causal relationships strongly influences evidence-based inference, using a subtler manipulation: He presented adults with the task of determining the effect of consuming colored liquids on the heart rate of an animal, varying whether the stated mechanism by which the liquids influenced heart rate was their taste or their strength as a drug. In the taste case, judgments made by the participants indicated a tendency to believe that the effect of combining both liquids would be the average of their individual effects, whereas judgments in the strength case were consistent with believing the combined effect would be the sum of the individual effects.

Finally, Beckers, De Houwer, Pineno, and Miller (2005) found evidence that the inferences people draw from a set of evidence are shaped by having seen earlier ''pre-training'' events, suggesting that the magnitude of an effect will be an additive or subadditive function of its combined causes. Importantly, the different pre-training events did not suggest different stories: Beckers et al. only manipulated the strength of the effect in the presence of two causes, so that in the additive condition it was the sum of the strength of the individual causes and in the subadditive condition it was the maximum. Participants then saw data from a standard ''blocking'' design, in which the effect occurred in the presence of one cause, *A*, alone, as well as in the presence of the two causes *A* and *B*. Those participants who had received additive pre-training showed a much stronger blocking effect, believing that *B* alone was unlikely to cause the effect as it did not seem to increase the magnitude of the effect when paired with *A*. This result is consistent with the assumptions of standard associative learning models (e.g., Rescorla & Wagner, 1972), which assume additive combination of causes.

These three studies illustrate that when people make inferences about the presence or strength of a causal relationship, they are sensitive to the form that any such relationship is likely to take, and that they can learn the form of a relationship from data. Inspired by these examples, the remainder of the paper explores the question of how we might use a computational model to explain how people learn about the functional form of causal relationships and apply that knowledge. We do this by laying out a general formal framework for modeling such learning and then testing the predictions of this approach within a specific causal system. We start by summarizing the key ideas behind existing models of causal learning.

3. Models of causal learning

Causal learning has been a topic of extensive study in cognitive psychology, resulting in a large number of formal models of human behavior (for a review, see Perales & Shanks, 2007). Our emphasis here will be on *rational* models of causal learning: models that explain human behavior as an optimal solution to a problem posed by the environment (Anderson,

1990; Marr, 1982). In the case of causal learning, the problem amounts to estimating the strength of a causal relationship or inferring that such a relationship exists (Cheng, 1997; Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2005). In this section, we will briefly describe some of the most prominent rational models of causal learning, dividing these models into those that focus on learning causal strength and those that focus on learning causal structure. In each case we will summarize the assumptions that these approaches make about functional form—strength-based approaches tend to assume a single fixed functional form, while structure-based approaches make weaker assumptions. First, however, we will describe the formal language of causal graphical models, which we will use to characterize the computational problem of causal induction.

3.1. Causal graphical models

Causal graphical models, or causal Bayes nets, are a formalism for representing and reasoning about causal relationships (Pearl, 2000; Spirtes et al., 1993). In a causal graphical model, all relevant variables are represented with nodes, and all direct causal relationships are represented using directed links, or edges, between nodes. In addition to carrying information about statistical relationships between variables, the link structure provides information about the effects of interventions and other exogenous influences on a causal system: Acting to change a variable *V* may only influence its descendants, that is, variables associated with nodes reachable by following the links directed away from *V*.

A causal graphical model depicting the example scenario from the introduction is shown in Fig. 1, in which one might, by intervening on the states of two switches, influence the activation of a light. Here, the states of the switches and the activation of the light are the variables being represented, so each is assigned a node. The links between the switch nodes and the light node indicate that the switches are direct causes of the light.

Specifying a probability distribution for each variable conditioned on its parents in the graph (i.e., those variables that are its direct causes) defines a joint distribution on all of the variables, which can be used to reason about the probability of observing particular events and the consequences of intervening on the system. However, an edge from one variable to


Fig. 1. Example of a causal graphical model describing the causal relationships behind the operation of a light, in which two light switches are both causes of its activation.

another in a causal graphical model does not imply a specific functional form for the relationship between cause and effect. Rather, direct causal (and thus statistical) dependence is all it indicates.

The full specification of any causal graphical model includes its *parameterization*, which defines the probability that any given variable will take a particular value, conditional on its direct causes. In our example, one might suppose that the probability that the light activates will be close to zero if either of the switches is not flipped, and close to one otherwise. The use of probabilities permits reasoning under incomplete information, which applies here as the reasoner may not know about the internal state of the light—there may be a loose wire or the filament might be broken. The functional form of a causal relationship is captured by the parameterization, allowing, for example, the complete causal graphical model to distinguish a situation where both switches independently turn on the light from one where a single switch turns it off, or where the light activates unreliably.

3.2. Learning causal strength

One approach to evaluating a prospective cause c is to take the difference between the probability of the target effect e in its presence, $P(e|c)$, and the probability of the effect in its absence, $P(e|\bar{c})$. This quantity, $P(e|c) - P(e|\bar{c})$, is known as ΔP, where the probabilities $P(e|c)$ and $P(e|\bar{c})$ are computed directly from contingency data. Proponents of ΔP argue that it is a general purpose measure of the strength of a causal relationship (Jenkins & Ward, 1965) as might result from an associative learning process (Shanks, 1995), but it does make assumptions about the nature of the causal relationship. This can be seen by viewing ΔP from the perspective of learning the structure and parameterization of a causal graphical model (Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2005; Tenenbaum & Griffiths, 2001). First, ΔP assumes that a particular ''focal set'' of causes be identified, which is to say that the set of causes or equivalently the structure of the causal graphical model is known in advance. Second, it assumes a parameterization under which the probability of the effect given multiple causes is a linear combination of its probability under separate causes: If the probability of the effect in the presence of a single cause C_i is w_i, then the probability of the effect given the values of its causes $C_1, \ldots, C_n$ is

$$P(e|c_1, \ldots, c_n) = \min\left(1, \sum_{i=1}^{N} c_i w_i\right) \tag{1}$$

where c_i takes the value one when the ith cause is present, zero otherwise. Under these assumptions, the value computed by the ΔP rule for a particular cause C_i is the w_i that maximizes the probability of the events observed by the learner, that is, the maximum likelihood estimate.

The limitations of ΔP as a model of human judgments motivated the development of the Power PC theory (Cheng, 1997), which takes causal learning to be a problem of inferring the ''causal power'' of prospective causes. The power of a generative causal relationship is defined to be

$$\frac{P(e|c) \ - \ P(e|\bar{c})}{1 \ - \ P(e|\bar{c})},$$

which is simply ΔP divided by the probability of the effect in the absence of the prospective cause. As with ΔP, the assumptions of causal power can be made explicit by casting it as inference about causal graphical models. As before, the structure is assumed a priori via the choice of focal set, but here the assumption about parameterization is that the probability of an effect given its causes follows a ''noisy-OR'' function (Cheng, 1997; Pearl, 1988), in which each cause has an independent chance to produce its effect (Glymour, 1998; Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2005), with

$$P(e|c_1, \ldots, c_n) = 1 - \prod_{i=1}^{n}(1 - w_i)^{c_i} \qquad (2)$$

where c_i is defined as in Eq. 1. As with ΔP, causal power computes the value of w_i that maximizes the probability of the observed events.

Lu, Yuille, Liljeholm, Cheng, and Holyoak (2007, 2008) recently proposed an extension of the causal power model in which Bayesian inference is used to identify the strength of a causal relationship. In this model, a prior distribution is defined on the strength of the relationship w_i, either being uniform or favoring stronger relationships, and this information is combined with contingency data to obtain a posterior distribution. A single estimate of the strength can be derived from this posterior distribution in several ways, such as taking the most probable or the average value. The basic assumptions behind this model are the same as those of the earlier causal power model (Cheng, 1997), taking the noisy-OR to be the appropriate functional form for the causal relationship, but Lu et al. (2007) and Lu, Rojas, Beckers, and Yuille (2008) showed that using an appropriate prior can improve the predictions that the model makes.

Finally, Novick and Cheng (2004) explored a way of extending the causal power model to accommodate relationships between multiple causes that go beyond the noisy-OR. In this extension, interactions between causes are handled by introducing new variables that represent combinations of causes. By considering possible generative and inhibitory effects of both the simple causes and their combinations, this model is capable of expressing a richer repertoire of functional forms. Yuille and Lu (2007) have shown that this approach can be used to capture any pattern of dependencies between multiple causes and an effect, with any conditional distribution being expressible as a combination of noisy logic gates.

3.3. Learning causal structure

While ΔP and causal power are rational measures of the strength of a causal relationship given certain assumptions about the nature of those relationships, another recent work has explored an alternative view of the problem of causal induction, focusing on the *structural* decision as to whether a causal relationship exists rather than its strength (Griffiths &

Tenenbaum, 2005). There are two general approaches to learning what causal structure underlies a set of observations.

The first approach to structure learning has been called the ''constraint-based'' approach and involves using statistical tests of independence (such as chi-squared) to determine which variables are related to one another and then reasoning deductively from patterns of dependencies to causal structures (e.g., Pearl, 2000; Spirtes et al., 1993). Constraint-based causal learning typically makes no assumptions about the nature of causal relationships, using statistical tests to search for violations of statistical independence and exploiting the fact that the structure of a graphical model implies certain independence relations, to identify the causal structure underlying the available evidence. This makes it possible to recover causal structures regardless of the functional form of the underlying relationships. However, this flexibility comes at the cost of efficiency. People can learn causal relationships from just a few observations of cause and effect (Gopnik & Sobel, 2000; Shultz, 1982), but constraint-based algorithms require relatively large numbers of data to determine causal structure (enough to produce statistical significance in a test of independence).[1]

The second approach to structure learning is to frame causal induction as a problem of Bayesian inference. In this approach, a learner must determine which hypothetical causal graphical model *h* is likely to be the true one, given observed data *d* and a set of beliefs about the plausibility of different models encoded in the *prior* probability distribution *P(h)*. Answering this question requires computing the *posterior* probability *P(h|d)*, which can be found by applying Bayes' rule

$$P(h|d) = \frac{P(d|h)P(h)}{\sum_{h'} P(d|h')P(h')} \tag{3}$$

where *P(d|h)* indicates the probability of observing *d* assuming that *h* is true, and is known as the *likelihood*. The likelihood is computed using the probability distribution associated with the causal graphical model *h*, and thus reflects the expectations of the learner about the functional form of causal relationships. However, in applications of Bayesian structure learning in machine learning (e.g., Cooper & Herskovits, 1992), minimal assumptions are made about the functional form of causal relationships—typically just that the probability of the effect differs in the presence and absence of a cause.

4. Modeling the effects of knowledge of functional form

The models of causal induction outlined in the previous section provide a basic framework in which to explore how prior knowledge influences the inferences that people make about causal relationships. However, none of these models directly addresses the problem of learning the functional form of a causal relationship and using that knowledge to inform future causal learning. Existing models either assume that causal relationships have a specific functional form or make no assumptions about the functional form of a causal relationship. Causal power and ΔP do not allow for the possibility that people might assume

different functional forms in different contexts, and constraint-based algorithms and standard Bayesian structure learning invoke minimal knowledge at the cost of efficiency. However, the Bayesian approach to causal learning provides us with the tools we need in order to explore how knowledge of functional form affects causal induction and how this knowledge is acquired. We will focus on learning causal structure, although a similar approach could be applied for learning causal strength.

4.1. Using knowledge of functional form

Bayesian inference uses two pieces of abstract knowledge. The first is some prior beliefs about which hypotheses are more likely than others, encoded in the prior distribution $P(h)$. The second is a set of expectations about what effects one should observe given that certain causes are present, encoded in the likelihood function $P(d|h)$. While most Bayesian structure learning algorithms make relatively generic assumptions about the prior and likelihood, we can make stronger assumptions in order to reflect the knowledge that learners possess. In particular, we can capture knowledge about the functional form of a causal relationship through our choice of likelihood.

We assume that the causal structures under consideration contain variables in two classes (prospective causes and effects), that the class to which each variable belongs is known, and that the only relationships that could potentially exist are those between causes and effects. The data, d, are events observed by the learner, consisting of causes being present or absent and effects either occurring or not. We also assume that the events in d are independent once the underlying causal structure is known, so that $P(d|h) = \Pi_k P(d_k|h)$ where d_k is a single event. Finally, we assume that the probability of a cause being present in a given event does not depend on the causal structure h, with the causal structure merely determining the probability that the effect occurs. Defining the likelihood then reduces to specifying the probability with which the effect occurs, given the number of its causes that are present.

Returning to the example of the light, different mechanisms translate into different probabilities for certain events, and consequently different likelihood functions. For instance, one might expect that a deterministic conjunctive function applies, giving the effect probability 1 when all causes are present, and 0 otherwise.[2] Alternately, a deterministic disjunctive function might apply, giving the effect probability 1 when at least one cause is present, and 0 otherwise. If there is reason to believe a noisy-OR relationship is at work, the probability of the effect is given by Eq. 2, as discussed previously.

Assuming that a causal system follows a specific functional form such as one of the above provides constraints that aid causal learning. For example, under a disjunctive function without background causes, just one observation of the presence of a cause and the occurrence of the effect is sufficient to indicate that a causal relationship exists. By exploiting this kind of information, Bayesian models incorporating knowledge about the functional form of causal relationships are capable of identifying causal structure from limited data in the same way as human learners (Tenenbaum & Griffiths, 2003).

This approach to characterizing how knowledge of functional form might be used is consistent with previous work in causal learning. The idea that the functional form is expressed

through the likelihood, defining the probability of the effect given the cause, is standard in statistical interpretations of causal strength estimation (Cheng, 1997; Glymour, 1998; Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2005; Lu et al., 2007, 2008). These models allow for a variety of functional forms, including noisy-OR relationships and their generalization to incorporate interactions and other kinds of noisy-logical circuits (Novick & Cheng, 2004; Yuille & Lu, 2007). By considering functional forms that allow linear combinations of causes (including averaging), the results of Waldmann (2007) and Beckers et al. (2005) could also be accommodated within this framework. However, a more significant challenge is explaining how people acquire knowledge of functional form that is appropriate to a given domain.

4.2. Learning causal theories

Bayesian inference provides a simple way to make use of abstract knowledge about the functional form of a causal relationship. More generally, the abstract knowledge needed to perform Bayesian inference can be expressed as a ''theory'' about a domain, identifying types of objects, the plausibility of causal relationships, and the form of those relationships (Griffiths, 2005; Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2007). The Bayesian approach also allows us to analyze how these theories themselves might be learned. The notion that we learn theories—complex, abstract, and consistent representations that like scientific theories reflect and facilitate inference about the structure of the real world—has a long history in cognitive development (Carey, 1991; Gopnik & Wellman, 1992). Recent work in computational modeling of causal learning has begun to extend the Bayesian approach to inferring the structure of causal graphical models to the level of theories, using hierarchical Bayesian models (Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2007; Tenenbaum & Griffiths, 2003).

The basic idea behind a hierarchical Bayesian model is to perform probabilistic inference at multiple levels of abstraction. In the case of causal learning, these levels are the hypothetical causal graphical models under consideration—the hypotheses h we have been discussing so far—and the abstract theories that generalize over these hypotheses. In the resulting probabilistic model, we assume that each theory t defines a probability distribution over hypotheses $P(h|t)$, just as each hypothesis defines a probability distribution over data, $P(d|h)$. To return to the example of the light and switches, we might thus characterize our knowledge of how electrical systems tend to work in terms of a probability distribution over a set of causal graphical models that differ in their parameterization, reflecting conjunctive, disjunctive, or other possible kinds of relationships. Each kind of parameterization would correspond to a different theory, t, with each theory defining a prior distribution over causal graphical models featuring that parameterization.

Like structure learning, theory learning can be reduced to a problem of Bayesian inference. If our goal is to infer a theory t from data d, we can do this by applying Bayes' rule, with

$$P(t|d) = \frac{P(d|t)P(t)}{\sum_{t'} P(d|t')P(t')} \tag{4}$$

where $P(t)$ is a prior distribution on theories. The likelihood $P(d|t)$ is obtained by summing over all hypothetical causal structures, with $P(d|t) = \sum_h P(d|h,t)P(h|t)$ where $P(d|h,t)$ is the

probability of the data given the structural hypothesis h under the theory t (reflecting the assumptions of the theory about the functional form of a causal relationship) and $P(h|t)$ is the probability of that hypothesis given the theory (reflecting assumptions about the plausibility of particular relationships).

Equation 4 applies Bayes' rule in the same way as it was applied to hypothetical causal structures in Eq. 3. However, theories are defined at a higher level of abstraction than hypotheses about the causal structure relating a specific set of variables. As a consequence, this knowledge supports generalization. For example, upon learning that two switches need to be pressed in order to turn on a light, a learner might believe that a conjunctive relationship is likely to apply in similar settings in the future. The idea that unknown variables can be shared across data sets is at the heart of hierarchical Bayesian models (for details, see Gelman, Carlin, Stern, & Rubin, 1995) and makes it possible for information from one data set to guide inferences from a second. More formally, learners who encounter a data set $d^{(1)}$ can update their posterior distributions over theories, computing $P(t|d^{(1)})$ as in Eq. 4. Upon encountering more data, $d^{(2)}$ in a similar setting, this posterior distribution over theories can be used to guide inferences about causal structure. Specifically, it takes the role of the prior over theories for interpreting the new data. The joint distribution on hypotheses and theories is given by

$$P(h, t|d^{(1)}, d^{(2)}) \propto P(d^{(2)}|h, t)P(h|t)P(t|d^{(1)}) \tag{5}$$

where the constant of proportionality is obtained by normalizing the distribution to sum to one over all h and t. The probability of a given causal structure is then obtained by summing over all theories, with

$$P(h|d^{(1)}, d^{(2)}) = \sum_t P(h, t|d^{(1)}, d^{(2)}) \tag{6}$$

allowing the abstract knowledge about causal relationships gleaned from $d^{(1)}$ to influence the conclusions drawn from $d^{(2)}$. Hierarchical Bayesian models thus allow learners to identify the abstract principles that organize a domain, updating their expectations as more data are observed.

This account of how knowledge of functional form can be acquired is the main novel contribution of our approach. It provides a way to understand how learners might make inferences about functional form from observing a causal system, and then use this knowledge later when learning about causal relationships. It differs from the previous approaches to modeling causal learning discussed above in allowing learners to flexibly identify a specific functional form for causal relationships in a given setting, instead of assuming a fixed functional form for all causal relationships, or making weak and generic assumptions about functional form. A similar approach was recently used by Lu, Rojas, Beckers, and Yuille (2008) to explain the results of Beckers et al. (2005) (for details, Section 11) and could be used to explain how children and adults form generalizations about the relationship between physical variables in the experiments of Zelazo and Shultz (1989), with different kinds of relationships corresponding to different causal theories. However, we chose to test the

predictions of this account by considering a novel causal system in which we can manipulate a variety of factors related to functional form.

5. Testing the predictions of the hierarchical Bayesian approach

The approach outlined in the previous section can be applied to the problem of acquiring and using knowledge of the functional form of causal relationships: Abstract theories can express different assumptions about functional form, allowing learners to infer what kind of functional form is most appropriate for a given domain. There are two qualitative predictions that distinguish this hierarchical Bayesian approach from other models of causal learning: (a) that people can make inferences appropriate to causal relationships with more than one kind of functional form and (b) that people can use evidence from one data set to inform their inferences from another involving different variables. In the remainder of the paper we present a test of these predictions, using a specific causal system to explore whether people can form generalizations about the functional form underlying a causal relationship and what factors influence this process. To do so, we use a causal inference problem in which knowledge of functional form is important, not known in advance, and which permits us to generate quantitative predictions with a specific hierarchical Bayesian model.

Suppose a learner is faced with the problem of identifying which of a set of objects are ''blickets'' using a ''blicketosity meter'' knowing only that blickets possess something called blicketosity and that the meter sometimes lights up and plays music (activates).[3] The hypotheses under consideration by the learner are partitions of objects into blicket and non-blicket classes. As activating the meter is the result of a causal relationship between the object and the detector, these hypotheses can be expressed as causal graphical models, where objects are prospective causes, activation is the effect, and a causal relationship exists between cause and effect if and only if the corresponding object is a blicket.

Crucially, two objects can be placed on the blicketosity meter simultaneously, making it possible to explore different functional forms for the underlying causal relationship. Different functional forms have strong implications for how the learner should interpret different events. For instance, if the learner believes that two blickets' worth of blicketosity are necessary to activate the meter, then seeing a single object failing to activate the meter is uninformative. Under such a belief, two objects that together activate the meter are both blickets, whereas that event under a disjunctive relationship suggests only that one or both of the objects is probably a blicket.

If people assume that the functional form of a causal relationship is fixed (e.g., linear or noisy-OR), or they make minimal assumptions about the functional form of causal relationships, then they will make the same inferences about casual structure regardless of evidence about functional form. Consequently, testing predictions in cases where structural inferences are guided by knowledge of functional form is a way to evaluate the central claims of a hierarchical Bayesian approach: that people entertain abstract theories about the functional form of causal relationships and update their beliefs about these theories in light of evidence. This logic motivated the experiments that we present in this paper. In describing these

experiments, we will also define a specific hierarchical Bayesian model, constructed by choosing likelihoods and priors that are simple, flexible, and appropriate to the cover story given to participants, and compare its numerical predictions to those generated by other models of causal inference.

In our experiments, participants were first presented with one of three sets of events involving three objects (*A*, *B*, *C*).[4] Participants saw events that had high probability under either a deterministic disjunctive, conjunctive, or noisy disjunctive theory (see Table 1). Next, all groups saw a set of events with three new objects (*D*, *E*, *F*) that was compatible with any of the three theories, *D−D−D− E− DF+ DF+*, that is, object *D* failing to activate the meter three times, *E* failing once, and a combination of *D* and *F* succeeding twice. If participants acquired knowledge about functional form using the first block of evidence, then they would be expected to come to different conclusions about which objects in the second were blickets.

Using the terms introduced in the previous section, the events involving *A*, *B*, and *C* form an initial data set $d^{(1)}$, and the events involving *D*, *E*, and *F* form a second data set $d^{(2)}$. After seeing $d^{(1)}$, learners can compute a posterior distribution over theories, $P(t|d^{(1)})$ by applying Eq. 4. This posterior distribution informs inferences about the hypothetical causal structures that could explain $d^{(2)}$, as outlined in Eqs. 5 and 6. The key prediction is that varying $d^{(1)}$ should affect inferences from $d^{(2)}$. This prediction is not made by any non-hierarchical model, because the events in $d^{(1)}$ do not involve any of the prospective causes in $d^{(2)}$. Without abstract acquired knowledge that spans multiple contexts, there is no continuity between the two sets of evidence.

While the qualitative predictions tested in our experiments are made by any hierarchical Bayesian model, we can also obtain quantitative predictions by considering a specific model that gives values to $P(d|h,t)$, $P(h|t)$, and $P(t)$. The appropriate model will depend on the context, as the hypotheses and theories that are relevant may vary. Our goal was thus not to define a general purpose model that could explain all instances of learning of functional form, but a simple model appropriate for characterizing the inferences that people make about functional form for the blicketosity meter. The main purpose of developing this model was to illustrate how people's judgments should be affected by our experimental manipulations, assuming a reasonable but relatively restricted set of possible functional forms.

Our hierarchical Bayesian model is defined in terms of the distributions $P(d|h,t)$, $P(h|t)$, and $P(t)$. We will discuss $P(h|t)$ first, then turn to $P(d|h,t)$ and $P(t)$. This is partly motivated by the fact that $P(h|t)$ is the simplest part of the model: We take all hypotheses regarding causal structure to be a priori equally likely, yielding $P(h|t) = P(h)$ where $P(h)$ is identical

Table 1
Evidence presented to participants in Experiment 1

Block	Evidence	Blicket
Conjunctive training	*A−B−C−AB−AC+BC−*	*A, C*
Noisy-disjunctive training	*A+B−C−AB−AC+BC−*	*A*
Deterministic disjunctive training	*A+B−C−AB+AC+BC−*	*A*
Test	*D−D−D−E−DF+DF+*	

for all structures. If the learner learns what the causal structure is (e.g., he or she is told what causal structure is present in the training block), then *P(h)* is updated to reflect that knowledge, so that the probability of the known structure becomes 1.

As for *P(d|h,t)*, we have already provided examples of how different functional forms might translate into likelihood functions, and we chose for our model a space of theories that can approximate noisy-OR, AND, and other relationships while being broadly compatible with the cover story provided to participants and requiring a small number of parameters. Specifically, we selected a sigmoid likelihood function:

$$P(e|N_{\text{blickets}} = n) = \frac{1}{1 + \exp\{-g(n - b)\}} \tag{7}$$

where N_{blickets} is the number of blickets among the present objects, *b* is the bias (i.e., the number of blickets necessary to make the meter equally likely to activate as not), and *g* gives the gain of the function. To give a sense of the generality of this function, when $b = 0.5$ and $g \gg 1$ one obtains a deterministic-OR function, $b = 1.5$, $g \gg 1$ gives a deterministic conjunctive function, and $b = 0.81$, $g = 7.37$ closely approximates a noisy-OR function with $w_i = 0.8$ for all *i* (see Fig. 2). Under this specification, the theory held by a learner amounts to his or her beliefs about the probable values of *b* and *g*.

Finally, we must provide a prior over theories, which under our model amounts to a probability density for *b* and *g*. For the sake of simplicity, we chose exponential priors for both *b* and *g*, each with a single hyperparameter (λ_b and λ_g) setting how rapidly the probabilities of values of *b* and *g* decrease. The probabilities of *b* and *g* were thus proportional to $\exp\{-\lambda_b b\}$ and $\exp\{-\lambda_g g\}$, respectively. If the mean of the prior distribution for the bias parameter is less than one (i.e., $\lambda_b > 1$), the prior beliefs favor disjunctive relationships, while a large value for the hyperparameter for the gain, λ_g, favors deterministic rather than noisy functions.[5] While we believe that our specification for the space of functional forms is generally appropriate for the cover stories in our experiments, we do not assert that it encompasses all theories that people can entertain. For example, Shanks and Darby (1998) discuss an experiment in which people learn that causes can independently bring about an effect but jointly do not, a functional form that cannot be specified in terms of the logistic function. We return to the issue of more general models of functional form learning in the Section 11.

With the training data we selected, our model predicts a disordinal interaction in which the rank order of the ratings for objects *D* and *E* reverses: In the conjunctive conditions object *D* was expected to be judged more likely to be a blicket than object *E*, and vice versa in the disjunctive conditions. This interaction, which emerges with a wide range of plausible values for λ_b and λ_g, is a consequence of the fact that the *D*− events should be taken as evidence against *D* being a blicket under a disjunctive theory, while under a conjunctive theory the *D*− events are uninformative and the *DF+* events indicate that *D* is a blicket. To make the quantitative predictions that we test in our experiments, a single value for each of λ_b and λ_g was chosen to minimize sum-squared error when compared with participants' ratings over all experiments, resulting in $\lambda_b = 4.329$ and $\lambda_g = 0.299$. The predictions were fairly insensitive to these values, a point that we explore in detail in Section 11.

Fig. 2. Examples of different kinds of relationship forms expressed as sigmoid functions.

In the remainder of the paper we present a series of experiments testing the predictions that discriminate our account from others. Experiment 1 examines learning about the functional form of causal relationships when the causal structure is known. Experiment 2 addresses the problem of learning about causal structure and functional form simultaneously, and Experiment 3 provides control conditions to confirm our interpretations of the results of Experiment 2. Experiment 4 tests additional predictions about the consequences of acquiring knowledge about functional forms, and Experiment 5 deals with the domain specificity of this knowledge.

6. Experiment 1: Known causal structure

Experiment 1 was designed to be a direct test of the predictions that distinguish a hierarchical Bayesian account from others, namely that events involving one set of variables will influence later inferences drawn about a different set of variables. Here, we simplified the

task by providing participants with the causal structure behind the first event set, leaving them only the problem of learning about functional form.

6.1. Methods

6.1.1. Participants

Participants were 57 undergraduates from the University of California, Berkeley, who received course credit for participation. These participants were divided into *deterministic disjunctive* ($n = 20$), *noisy-disjunctive* ($n = 20$), and *conjunctive* ($n = 17$) conditions.

6.1.2. Materials and procedure

The stimuli were six identical beige $2'' \times 2'' \times 2''$ cubes, labeled *A*, *B*, *C*, *D*, *E*, and *F*, and a green $5'' \times 7'' \times 3''$ box with a translucent orange panel on top, called a ''blicketosity meter.'' A hidden foot-controlled switch allowed the experimenter to toggle the meter between a state in which it activated when objects were placed on it and a state in which it did not. When activated, the box played a short melody and the orange panel was illuminated by a light inside.

The experiment consisted of two trials. In the first trial, participants were told that some blocks are blickets, some are not, and that blickets possess blicketosity, while nonblickets possess no blicketosity. They were also told that the blicketosity meter had a binary response: It could either activate or not. One or two objects were then identified as blickets (see Table 1, third column). They were given no more information about the nature of blickets or the blicketosity meter. The experimenter provided participants with evidence by placing the first three objects (*A*, *B*, and *C*), singly or in groups, on the box. By surreptitiously toggling the hidden foot switch, the experimenter was able to control which combinations of objects appeared to activate the machine. There were three different training evidence conditions, labeled by the form of causal relationship they suggested: *deterministic-disjunctive*, *noisy-disjunctive*, and *conjunctive*. Table 1 gives the specific events presented in each condition.

After the training block was presented, the objects were set aside, and three new objects labeled *D*, *E*, and *F* were introduced. Participants then saw a block of test evidence that was the same across all conditions, *D*− *D*− *D*− *E*− *DF*+ *DF*+. These specific events were chosen to lead to different beliefs about which objects were blickets, depending on what kind of relationship participants believed applied.

After participants saw the evidence in the test block, they recorded the probability they assigned to each of the test objects *D*, *E*, and *F* being blickets on a 0–10 scale, having been told that a 10 indicated they were absolutely certain the object was a blicket, a 0 indicated absolute certainty it was not, and a 5 indicated that it was equally likely to be a blicket as not.

Finally, after all participants had recorded their ratings, they were prompted to record in plain English their theories of how the meter interacted with blickets and nonblickets, and how the meter operated.

6.2. Results and discussion

The mean ratings are shown in Fig. 3. The prediction that causal knowledge derived from one set of objects constrains subsequent inferences was supported: One-way ANOVAs found an effect of the Trial 1 data on judgments in Trial 2 for both object D ($F[2,54] = 58.1$, $p < 0.001$, $\eta^2 = 0.68$) and object E ($F[2,54] = 11.353$, $p < 0.001$, $\eta^2 = 0.2$). The specific effects we expected were that object D would be given higher ratings in the *conjunctive* condition than in the *deterministic-disjunctive* condition, and that object E would have a higher rating in the *noisy-disjunctive* condition than in the *deterministic-disjunctive* condition. We found support for the first of these effects ($t[35] = 8.759$, $p < 0.001$, $d = 1.64$) and a trend consistent with the second ($t[38] = -1.603$, $p = 0.117$, $d = -0.50$). The data also supported the hypothesis that many participants in the *conjunctive* test block were inferring that a conjunctive relationship applied to the events: the mean rating of D in the *conjunctive* condition was significantly higher than 5 ($t[16] = 3.15$, $p < 0.01$, $d = 0.76$), indicating that D was considered more likely than not to be a blicket, something that is inconsistent with all linear and noisy-disjunctive interpretations.[6]

The numerical predictions of our model closely matched participants' behavior: The within-condition rank orders of ratings were in perfect agreement, mean-squared error was 0.38, and the linear correlation between the ratings and participants' judgments was 0.99. We can evaluate the performance of the model by comparing it with alternative models that also make quantitative predictions. As mentioned previously, ΔP and causal power do not predict that responses will vary between any of our conditions. Under ΔP, the predicted response for D is $P(e|D) - P(e|\bar{D})$, or $\frac{2}{5}$, for a rating of 4. Causal power normalizes that quantity by $1 - P(e|\bar{D})$, also giving 4 for D. The predicted ratings for E and F under both ΔP and causal power are 0 and 10, respectively. These models' predictions are accurate in the disjunctive conditions where their assumptions regarding functional form are appropriate, but in the *conjunctive* condition their predictions diverge from the data, leading to an


Fig. 3. Results of Experiment 1, showing the model predictions and human ratings of the probability that test condition objects are blickets.

overall mean-squared error per rating of 5.83 and a correlation of 0.82 with human ratings. We will evaluate some extensions of these models in Section 11.

We can also compare the performance of our model with that of the best possible model that is blind to the training evidence. This model would make optimal predictions for the ratings of *D*, *E*, and *F*, under the constraint that the ratings must be the same across all three conditions. The best predictions for *D*, *E*, and *F*—in terms of minimizing error and maximizing correlation—are equal to their observed means across all three conditions. Such predictions yield a mean-squared error of 3.97 and a linear correlation of 0.83. The best possible model that ignores condition thus performs much worse than our Bayesian model, as this model fails to capture the change in ratings produced by providing different information about the functional form of the causal relationship.

In order to establish that participants' ratings reflected their beliefs about the form of the causal relationships and were likely to generalize appropriately to evidence beyond that provided in our experiment, we analyzed the plain English theories participants expressed after the second trial. Two hypothesis- and condition-blind research assistants coded participants' theories about how the meter worked, resolving any differences through discussion. The features recorded for each theory included the following: (a) whether the theory was interpretable, (b) whether blickets and nonblickets increased, decreased, or had no influence on the probability of the effect, (c) whether the effect was perfectly, imperfectly, or not predictable given its observable causes, and (d) whether the relationship was conjunctive. The overall proportion of theories that was interpretable was 0.74, and it did not differ significantly between conditions (Fisher's exact text, $p > 0.5$).

Differences in participants' explicit theories were consistent with learning about the form of the causal relationship: A greater proportion of interpretable theories in the *conjunctive* condition were consistent with a conjunctive relationship (12 of 13) than in the *deterministic-* and *noisy-disjunctive* conditions (3 of 16 and 4 of 13, respectively) (Fisher's exact test, $p < 0.01$). Participants in the *noisy-disjunctive* condition expressed theories that involved noise or imperfect predictive ability more frequently (5 of 13 interpretable theories versus 1 of 16 for the *deterministic-disjunctive* condition and 0 of 13 for the *conjunctive* condition; Fisher's exact test, $p < 0.05$).

The results of the experiment support our account of causal learning: People developed different theories about the functional form of the causal relationship, and they used these theories when reasoning about the existence of individual causal relationships. However, as people were provided with information about the relationships that existed among the objects presented in the training block, this remains a modest test of their ability to learn the functional form of causal relationships. As a more ambitious test, we conducted Experiment 2, in which participants were forced to learn about causal structure and functional form simultaneously.

7. Experiment 2: Unknown causal structure

Having found the predicted pattern of judgments when participants knew which training objects were blickets, we conducted Experiment 2 to test the prediction that people

can concurrently learn about the causal structure and functional form of causal relationships. We did this using a procedure identical to Experiment 1, save that we withheld the identities of the blickets in the training block, effectively hiding the underlying causal structure. In addition, we took the opportunity to address an alternative interpretation of the results of Experiment 1, under which participants took there to be the same number of blickets in both blocks of evidence and mapped objects in the test block to objects in the training block. We ran a new condition to test this possibility, in which participants saw evidence that was probably given a deterministic-OR relationship and two blickets. If the alternative explanation were true, then participants would be expected to pick out two of the *D*, *E*, and *F* objects as blickets. If people are using information about the functional form of causal relationships to make inferences in the test condition, then their judgments should be similar to those in the one-blicket deterministic disjunctive condition.

7.1. Methods

7.1.1. Participants

Participants were 102 undergraduates from the University of California, Berkeley, who received course credit for participation, again divided into *deterministic-disjunctive* ($n = 26$), *noisy-disjunctive* ($n = 26$), and *conjunctive* ($n = 24$) conditions, with an additional deterministic disjunctive *base-rate control* ($n = 26$) condition.

7.1.2. Materials and procedure

The first three conditions were identical to those in Experiment 1, but participants were told nothing about which objects were blickets in the training block, and instead were asked to provide probabilities as in the test block. These will again be referred to as the *deterministic-disjunctive*, *noisy-disjunctive*, and *conjunctive* conditions. The *base-rate control* condition was an additional control to establish that participants were not merely using base-rate information to infer that a specific number of blickets were present in the test block. The evidence participants saw was intended to be compatible with a deterministic disjunctive relationship, but with two blickets present rather than one. The procedure was the same as in the previous three conditions, but the specific training evidence participants saw was *A+ B+ C− AB+ AC+ BC+*.

7.2. Results and discussion

Our first analyses focused on the three conditions from Experiment 1, the *deterministic-disjunctive*, *noisy-disjunctive*, and *conjunctive* conditions. As in Experiment 1, there was an effect of the training block on judgments in Trial 2 for *D* ($F[2,73] = 6.026$, $p < 0.01$, $\eta^2 = 0.14$). More specifically, object *D* was given higher ratings in the *conjunctive* condition than in the *deterministic-disjunctive* condition ($t[48] = 3.472$, $p < 0.01$, $d = 0.89$). Contrary to our predictions, the mean rating given to object *E* was not higher in the *noisy-disjunctive* condition than in the *conjunctive* condition, which we discuss below. With the exception of

this reversal, the ordinal match between numerical predictions of our model and participants' ratings was exact. Mean-squared error was 0.29 and the linear correlation between the predictions and participants' ratings was 0.99. The mean ratings and model predictions are shown in Fig. 4. For comparison, the predictions of both ΔP and causal power yielded an MSE of 4.03 and a correlation of 0.90. Because the ratings varied less between conditions, the best-possible training-blind predictions were better than in Experiment 1, giving an MSE of 0.63 and a correlation of 0.97. As in Experiment 1, participants' explicit theories mentioned conjunctive relationships more often in the *conjunctive* condition (13 of 17) than in the *noisy-disjunctive* (6 of 23) and *deterministic-disjunctive* (5 of 23) conditions (Fisher's exact test, $p < 0.001$)

In retrospect, the higher-than-expected rating for *D* in the *noisy-disjunctive* condition is unsurprising given that the training events were also compatible with complex deterministic theories, and previous work suggests that people tend to believe that complex deterministic causal relationships are more likely than simple stochastic relationships (Schulz & Sommerville, 2006). The theories participants expressed were compatible with this interpretation: only 13% (3 of 23) of the interpretable theories mentioned noise or an imperfectly predictable effect versus 38% (5 of 13) in the *noisy-disjunctive* condition of Experiment 1, although this difference was not significant (Fisher's exact test, $p = 0.11$). If people are inferring that deterministic relationships outside our space of theories apply, then making it clear that the


Fig. 4. Results of Experiment 2, showing the model predictions and human ratings of the probability that test condition objects are blickets.

generative relationship is subject to occasional failure will bring participants' ratings back in line with our predictions. We explore this possibility in the next experiment.

Finally, the results of our additional control condition were consistent with our account. In the *base-rate control* condition the mean ratings for objects *D* and *E* were lower than in the original *deterministic-disjunctive* condition, giving a larger effect when comparing *conjunctive* condition ratings for *D* ($t[48] = 4.18$, $p < 0.001$, $d = 1.02$), as predicted by our model and contrary to what an alternative explanation based on the frequency with which blickets appear in the training data would predict.

8. Experiment 3: The effects of noise

In Experiment 2 we found that participants' judgments in the *noisy-disjunctive* condition deviated from the predictions of our model, and we speculated that participants were inferring that complex deterministic relationships produced the events. To test whether this was the case, we ran two new conditions in which we provided explicit evidence that the meter was subject to unpredictable failures to activate. In the first, we gave participants training events that were incompatible with a deterministic explanation by prepending two failure events (*A− A−*) to the *noisy-disjunctive* data in Experiment 2. In the second we told participants that the meter was failure prone. If participants' unexpected judgments in Experiment 2 were the result of their rejecting the possibility that the relationship was noisy, then both interventions should lead to ratings for *D* being lower than those for *E*.

8.1. Methods

8.1.1. Participants
Participants were 41 undergraduates from the University of California, Berkeley, who received course credit for participation, divided into *event-based noise* ($n = 3$) and *description-based noise* ($n = 28$) conditions.

8.1.2. Materials and procedure
The two conditions used a procedure based on that in the *noisy-disjunctive* condition of Experiment 2. In the *description-based noise* condition participants were told, ''Sometimes, the blicketosity meter randomly fails to go off when it should.'' The *event-based noise* condition added two events in which object A failed to activate the meter to the *noisy-disjunctive* training block, so that participants saw the events *A+ A− A− B− C− AB− AC+ BC−* in the training block. The two conditions were otherwise identical. As in Experiments 1 and 2, the test evidence was *D− D− D− E− DF+ DF+*.

8.2. Results and discussion

Under both manipulations, the mean participant ratings for *D* were lower than *E*, a result that was significant after aggregating data from the two manipulations ($t[40] = −2.03$,

$p = 0.049$, $d = 0.32$). Comparing the effect of these two manipulations on the difference between the D and E ratings with the $D - E$ difference in the *noisy-disjunctive* condition of Experiment 2, yielded a significant difference in the *description-based noise* condition ($t[52] = 2.41$, $p = 0.019$, $d = 0.63$), and a trend in the *event-based noise* condition ($t[37] = 1.92$, $p = 0.062$, $d = 0.63$).

The correlation between the ratings of participants and the predictions of the model was 0.98, and the mean-squared error was 0.55. Mean ratings and model predictions are given in Fig. 5. With this indication that people make the inferences one would expect when they have evidence for a failure-prone system, we can test another prediction of our model: that people can use covariation evidence to learn how noisy a class of causal relationships is and use that information to make more accurate inferences about causal structures involving novel objects.

9. Experiment 4: Manipulating causal strength

If people are transferring knowledge about the strength of the relationship between the presence of blickets and activation of the meter, then one would expect to see different ratings for the probability of D, E, and F being blickets as the training set is manipulated to suggest higher or lower failure rates for the meter. Specifically, our intuitions and model predict that the probability that D is a blicket given the test data are higher under a high failure rate noisy-disjunctive relationship than one that fails infrequently; under a nearly failure-free relationship, the three failures to activate under D constitute strong evidence against D being a blicket, while the evidence against E—a single failure—is weaker. At the opposite extreme, when the meter rarely activates for a blicket, the three failures constitute weak evidence that D is not a blicket, while the activation under D and F together is now positive evidence for D being a blicket. We tested this prediction with another experiment.


Fig. 5. Results of Experiment 3, showing the model predictions and human ratings of the probability that test condition objects are blickets.

9.1. Methods

9.1.1. Participants

Participants were 41 undergraduates from the University of California, Berkeley, who received course credit for participation, divided into *high-noise* ($n = 20$) and *low-noise* ($n = 21$) conditions. One participant was excluded for explaining that the blicketosity meter detected nonblickets.

9.1.2. Materials and procedure

The procedure was similar to that used in the *event-based noise* condition in Experiment 3, but the evidence was varied between two conditions to indicate different failure rates. The evidence in the *low-noise* condition was A+ A+ A+ A− A+ A+ B− C− AB− AC+ BC−, where the meter activated five out of six times given object *A* alone. The evidence in the *high-noise* condition was A− A− A− A+ A− A− B− C− AB− AC+ BC−, where the meter activated one out of six times given object *A* alone.

9.2. Results and discussion

The mean rating for *D* was higher in the *high-noise* condition (3.8, SD 2.4) than in the *low-noise* condition (1.8, SD 2.4), ($t[39] = 2.57$, $p = 0.014$, $d = 0.753$), consistent with the predictions of the model. As in the previous experiments, the quantitative predictions of the model were accurate, with a correlation with ratings of 0.98 and a mean-squared error of 0.52.

At this point we have shown that people used covariational evidence to learn about the functional form of causal relationships—including whether the basic structure of the relationship was conjunctive or disjunctive, and the strength of disjunctive relationships—and used that knowledge to guide their later inferences. However, it might be argued that what we have observed was not the acquisition of abstract knowledge, but rather a sort of domain-general priming effect, in which participants' inferences after the training block might broadly favor kinds of relationships consistent with the evidence they had seen, and confabulated when recording their theories. One might also argue that our results were peculiar to our particular cover story or manner of presenting evidence to participants. We designed Experiment 5 to address these possibilities.

10. Experiment 5: Effects of domain

This experiment had three goals: (a) to gather support for the idea that the learning demonstrated in previous experiments is a matter of acquiring domain-specific knowledge rather than priming kinds of causal relationships in a domain-independent way, (b) to establish that the effects observed do not depend on the use of a live demonstration, and (c) to show that the transfer-learning effect is not restricted to the ''blicketosity

meter'' cover story. Accordingly, we used a survey procedure in which we described a causal learning scenario and manipulated the domains in which the training and test stimuli were presented, as well as whether those domains matched or differed from one another. The critical prediction is that we should see knowledge of functional form acquired through training having a far greater effect on inferences at test when the domains of the training and test scenarios match.

10.1. Methods

10.1.1. Participants

Participants were 60 undergraduates from the University of California, Berkeley, split equally over four conditions corresponding to two test domains crossed with whether the training domain matched or differed from the test domain.

10.1.2. Materials and procedure

Each participant completed one of four surveys, which varied according to two factors. The first was whether the test block of evidence had a cover story identical to that used in Experiments 1–4, or a novel one which replaced the activation of the meter with a fearful response by a cat and blickets with ''Daxes''—rodents of a particular kind. The second factor was the use of a matched or different cover story for the training block of evidence, which had the same structure as the *conjunctive* condition in Experiment 1.

The first page of each survey contained the training block cover story, evidence, and ratings questions, which were identical to those used in the previous experiments. The second page contained ''answers'' identifying which prospective causes in the training block were blickets/daxes, in order to maximize the effect of training as predicted by the model and observed in previous experiments. The third page contained the cover story and evidence and ratings questions for the transfer block, and the fourth page contained a question about participants' beliefs about the mechanism behind the blicket-meter or dax-cat causal relationship. In this experiment the items corresponding to D, E, and F were identified as X, Y, and Z but will be referred to as D, E, and F here for the sake of clarity.

10.2. Results and discussion

Mean ratings for all test objects in all four conditions are shown in Fig. 6. The variable of interest was the rating capturing participants' beliefs that D was a cause. A two-way ANOVA (cross-domain by transfer domain) revealed a main effect of changing domains between the training and test blocks ($F[1,56] = 12.8$, $p < 0.001$, $\eta^2 = 0.18$), a nonsignificant effect of domain ($F[1,56] = 2.231$, $p = 0.141$, $\eta^2 = 0.03$) and no interaction $F[1,56] = 0.532$, $p = 0.532$. The main effect of crossing domain, absent any interaction, indicates that participants did not blindly map the prospective causes in the second block to those in the first, and that the transfer learning effect was not merely a consequence of learning an abstract function without attaching it to a context or domain.

Fig. 6. Mean ratings of the probability that the test block items *D*, *E*, and *F* are blickets or daxes, by condition. The first label term gives the training cover story, and the second term gives the test cover story.

11. General discussion

Previous work has shown that people can use and acquire knowledge of the functional form of causal relationships. We have outlined a general formal framework providing a rational analysis of these processes in terms of hierarchical Bayesian inference, and presented a series of experiments that test the predictions of this account. Experiment 1 showed that people can learn and generalize the functional form of a causal relationship when they are provided with explicit information about causal structure. Experiment 2 showed that such inferences can be made directly from covariational evidence. Experiments 3 and 4 showed that people's inferences about functional form are appropriately sensitive to manipulations of noise and the strength of causal relationships. Experiment 5 showed that transfer of knowledge of functional form from one causal learning scenario to another was greater when those scenarios used the same causal system than when they came from quite different domains. The inferences that people made in all of these experiments were consistent with the predictions of our model, both qualitatively and quantitatively.

In this section, we turn to several important issues that have arisen at various points in the paper and deserve further discussion. First, we consider robustness of the model predictions to variation in parameter values. Second, we discuss individual differences in our data, and how these individual differences line up with model predictions. Finally, we provide a more detailed discussion of how our hierarchical Bayesian approach relates to other models of causal learning.

11.1. Robustness and interpretation of parameters

Our model has only two parameters—the hyperparameters λ_b and λ_g that determine the prior on functional form—and we used a single pair of values for these parameters to predict

the results from all of the experiments. However, understanding the consequences of manipulating these parameters is an important part of evaluating our model. As with any model with fitted parameters, it is possible that the specific values of λ_b and λ_g we selected were crucial for the model to make accurate predictions of human judgments. Given that only two parameters were used to predict 18 distinct ratings across the experiments we presented, the concern is not with overfitting the data, but that we need to understand what range of parameter values defines an appropriate space of theories.

To address this issue, we examined the sensitivity of the model to parameter choices by evaluating the model's performance given all combinations of $1/\lambda_b$ values ranging from 0.15 to 0.5 in increments of 0.025 and $1/\lambda_g$ values ranging from 2.5 to 5 in increments of 0.25. We used the reciprocal of λ_b and λ_g because those quantities correspond to the mean gain and bias sampled from the resultant prior distribution. We excluded the *description-based noise* condition from this analysis because the only way to express the additional verbal information would have been to introduce a new condition-specific parameter altering the prior distribution over gain and bias. The results of this investigation are displayed in Fig. 7, which shows the mean-squared error of the model over all experiments as a function of $1/\lambda_b$ and $1/\lambda_g$. This analysis shows that it is important that the mean of the prior on the bias be low ($1/\lambda_b > 0.35$), but the mean of the gain distribution is not especially important.

Mean squared error (MSE) as a function of parameters

Fig. 7. Mean-squared error of the model for all conditions except verbal explicit-noise as a function of parameter values. For comparison, the lowest possible MSE for a model that does not take advantage of training block information is 1.92.

These results are interesting not just in terms of understanding the robustness of the model predictions, but in what they reveal about the inductive biases of human learners. The range of parameter values that produce a low MSE are those that are consistent with a prior over theories that favors disjunctive relationships over conjunctive relationships. Such a prior seems appropriate for the blicketosity meter, and also fits well with the large body of work suggesting that people assume a noisy-OR relationship for many kinds of causal systems (Cheng, 1997; Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2005).

11.2. Individual differences

When evaluating our model, we compared its predictions with the mean responses of our participants. While this is a common practice, it leaves open the question of whether the observed fits are artifacts of averaging different modes in the responses, each of which is poorly fit by the model (Estes, 1956; Myung, Kim, & Pitt, 2000; Navarro, Griffiths, Steyvers, & Lee, 2006). Exploring individual differences also gives us the opportunity to conduct a more fine-grained analysis of how well our model predicts the responses of the participants in our experiments, including information about the variability in responses as well as the mean.

To examine the correspondence between the model predictions and the data produced by individual participants, we used our model to generate predictions about the distribution of ratings in Experiment 1 and compared these predictions with the observed distribution of participants' ratings. The predictive distribution was generated in accordance with previous research indicating that individuals *probability-match*: Rather than averaging over all hypotheses to produce a single judgment, they select a single hypothesis randomly with probability equal to its subjective probability of being true (Vul & Pashler, 2008). Specifically, we sampled 5,000 hypotheses per condition of Experiment 1, each with probability equal to the hypothesis' probability of being true, conditioned on the training block for that condition and the common test block. Each hypothesis gives a probability that D, E, and F are blickets. We mapped these to the participants' scale by multiplying by 10 and rounding to the nearest whole number and compared their distribution with participants' responses for objects D and E given the same evidence, leaving out ratings for object F because they were not essential to our earlier analysis, they varied less between conditions, and they would have made visualizing the distribution more difficult. The two sets of distributions are shown in Fig. 8, which indicates that there are no major disparities. Moreover, many of the differences can be ascribed to participants preferentially selecting values of 0, 5, and 10, which were mentioned explicitly in the task instructions.

11.3. Related work

In the body of the paper, we discussed some well-known models of causal inference, and we showed that these models are unable to explain our experimental data. The main problem with these models is that they are not designed to predict the effects of learning about

Fig. 8. Frequencies of specific pairs of ratings for objects *D* and *E*, organized by condition. The upper row contains the model predictions, and the lower row contains participants' ratings. The two distributions are generally in close concordance.

functional form. However, some more recent work bears on the kind of problem we have considered. We will briefly summarize the most salient examples and discuss the novelty of our contributions in light of them.

11.3.1. Alternative priors on functional forms

Much previous work has proceeded on the assumption that a single functional form is appropriate for describing all contexts in which causal learning takes place (e.g., Cheng, 1997; Novick & Cheng, 2004). If one makes this assumption, it becomes natural to ask whether there exist generic priors over kinds of function that apply across a wide range of domains. Lu, Yuille, Liljeholm, Cheng, and Holyoak (2006) make such a suggestion, albeit without appealing to hierarchically structured knowledge or cross-context generalization, and we believe that identifying generic priors is an exciting direction for future work. We suspect, however, that such priors must be more abstract and flexible than any specific proposals to date to account for human causal inference, and we note that a hierarchical model incorporating the ''necessary and sufficient'' priors described by Lu et al. does not appear to explain participants' capacity to make inferences consistent with expecting a conjunctive causal relationship.

To test this suspicion, we implemented a hierarchical model like our own but with a space of theories that reflected ''necessary and sufficient'' priors: All causal relationships were taken to have a noisy-OR form, where blickets had the same weight *w* and there was a latent

background cause with weight w_n. The prior probability of a pair of weights was the same as given in Lu et al.:

$$\frac{1}{Z}[e^{-\alpha(w_n - w)} + e^{-\alpha(w - w_n)}],$$

where Z is a normalizing constant. Once we optimized α, giving $\alpha = 2.40$, this model performed much better than those that assume a fixed relationship, with an MSE of 0.71 (approximately twice the MSE resulting from using our sigmoid theory space). Nonetheless, this model failed to make the key prediction that people would infer that two blickets were necessary to activate the meter in the Experiment 2 conditions, leading us to conclude that any psychologically real generic prior must be more flexible than these ''necessary and sufficient'' priors.

11.4. Causal coherence

Lien and Cheng (2000) presented a theory explaining how people might identify the level of generality at which causal inferences should be made and use that knowledge to aid later inference. For example, in learning about the effects of a set of chemicals, one might either infer a relationship between a specific chemical and an outcome, or form generalizations about the effects of particular types of chemicals. There are some similarities between the basic structure of their experimental design and our own that raise the question of how well the notion of ''causal coherence'' they articulated might explain our results.

The basic argument in Lien and Cheng (2000) is that people learn what level of generality is best for representing particular causal variables by selecting the best level from a set identified a priori, where the best level maximizes $P(e|c) - P(e|\bar{c})$, with c denoting a cause identified at that level and e the effect. Lien and Cheng illustrate this idea with an example using cigarettes and lung cancer: Given enough data, one could infer that lung cancer is caused by (a) smoking particular brands of cigarettes, (b) smoking cigarettes, or (c) inhaling any kind of fumes. Option (b) is preferable to (a) under the contrast criterion because $P(e|\text{brand}) \approx P(e|\text{cigarettes})$ and $P(e|\text{brand}) > P(e|\text{cigarettes})$, and option (b) is preferable to (c) under the assumption that ''fumes'' includes substances such that $P(e|\text{fumes}) - P(e|\overline{\text{fumes}}) < P(e|\text{cigarettes}) - P(e|\overline{\text{cigarettes}})$.

While it does predict certain kinds of transfer of knowledge, such a theory cannot explain our data: The only levels of generality our participants could have identified were specific objects, ''blickets'' and ''all objects,'' and inference to any of these as causes leads to the problems faced by any nonhierarchical model. A more general variation on the idea of identifying the appropriate level of abstraction leads to the argument that a learner could use preexisting domain knowledge to identify arbitrary events as prospective causes and use the same contrast criterion to select amongst those. For instance, the ''levels of abstraction'' could include ''one blicket,'' ''two blickets,'' ''one blicket and one nonblicket,'' and so on as possible causes. This might explain the results of Experiment 1, but more machinery is necessary to explain the fact that participants concurrently learned causal structure and functional form in Experiment 2. Moreover, this variation leads to so many possible causes that

a graded measure of plausibility is necessary along with a description of how that would interact with contrast. We believe that filling these holes in a natural, parsimonious way would lead to a model indistinguishable from a hierarchical Bayesian approach.

11.5. Other hierarchical Bayesian models

Other hierarchical Bayesian models of causal inference have been presented recently, including one concerned with learning ''causal schemata'' (Kemp et al., 2007) and an account of sequential causal learning (Lu, Rojas, et al., 2008). We would like to make clear that our approach is not in competition with these. Rather, these perspectives are complementary. Kemp et al.'s contribution extends the *infinite relational model* (Kemp, Tenenbaum, Griffiths, Yamada, & Ueda, 2006) to account for learning concurrently about types and the causal relationships between them, but it makes no provision for flexibly learning the form of causal relationships. Integrating a hierarchical representation of the functional form with causal schemata would provide a natural answer to the question of how people learn about functional form across diverse contexts.

Lu et al.'s (2008) sequential learning research touches on inferring the form of causal relationships, but it commits to using two explicit forms—additive (linear sum) and subadditive (noisy-MAX) functions for continuous variables—being largely concerned with explaining the effects of presentation order. While their model cannot explain the range of phenomena we have discussed, it nicely complements our focus on functional forms for binary variables. Taken together with the results we have presented in this paper, this work suggests that a hierarchical Bayesian approach has the potential to provide a unifying framework for explaining how people learn the functional form of causal relationships.

11.6. Toward a more general model of functional form learning

The specific hierarchical Bayesian model we used to generate quantitative predictions, in which the set of possible functional forms is constrained to those that are consistent with the logistic function, was motivated by its simplicity, flexibility, and consistency with the cover stories that framed the evidence that participants saw in our experiments. While this model was consistent with the judgments that participants made in these experiments, it was not intended as a general account of how people learn the functional form of causal relationships. In particular, it is inconsistent with functional forms that have previously been explored in the causal learning literature, such as the experiment by Shanks and Darby (1998) in which people learned that two causes produced an effect independently but not when they occurred together.

The hierarchical Bayesian framework we have presented provides the basis for a more general model of functional form learning, but it would need to be supplemented with a richer set of theories concerning possible functional forms. The challenge in doing so lies in defining a systematic way to specify these theories. One possibility is suggested by the recent work of Yuille and Lu (2007), who showed that noisy-logical circuits consisting of combinations of variables interacting through noisy-OR, noisy-AND, and negation opera-

tions could approximate any discrete probability distribution. This result suggests that noisy-logical circuits might provide a reasonable foundation for characterizing a richer hypothesis space of an functional forms, with the prior probability of a particular functional form depending on the complexity of its expression in terms of these operations (for examples of this kind of an approach in categorization, see Feldman, 2000; Goodman, Tenenbaum, Feldman, & Griffiths, 2008).

One important step toward understanding how people learn the functional form of causal relationships more generally is identifying the prior probability assigned to different kinds of relationships. The simple model we used in this paper made it possible to draw inferences about this prior directly from people's judgments, through the parameter λ_b and λ_g. Identifying priors over richer sets of functions poses more of a challenge and will require experiments investigating the difficulty that people encounter in learning functions of different forms. We are currently conducting experiments looking at a wider range of functional forms, and exploring the possibility of using a probabilistic logic to capture the human ability to make inferences consistent with a wide range of functional forms while still exploiting prior knowledge, as in the cases we consider here.

12. Conclusion

The results of our experiments show that people efficiently learn about the functional forms of causal relationships using covariation data, category information, and verbal cues, making judgments that are accurately predicted by a hierarchical Bayesian model. These results are compatible with earlier experimental results suggesting that people are sensitive to causal mechanisms and with developmental theories about domain knowledge and framework theories, but they are not predicted by most existing models of covariation-based causal inference. The Bayesian approach we have taken in this paper is capable of explaining not just how knowledge of causal mechanisms should influence causal inference, but how that knowledge could itself be acquired.

If human causal inference is tightly coupled to abstract knowledge, then some questions remain to be answered. How flexible is this knowledge? Do we possess general inductive mechanisms that permit us to learn a broader set of kinds of causal relationships than are common in the world given sufficient evidence, or do we operate under tight constraints? Where does abstract knowledge about categories and properties intersect with causal inference? Work along these lines is in progress and we ultimately hope to begin to chart both the structure of adults' causal theories and the developmental trajectory of the acquisition of this knowledge.

Notes

1. Nothing prevents constraint-based approaches from including assumptions about functional form to facilitate rapid learning—in such cases one would test specific classes

of relationships reflecting the assumptions rather than general statistical independence—but such assumptions lead to the same restrictions that face other fixed-form models.

2. A note on terminology: We have chosen to use the terms *disjunctive* and *conjunctive* instead of, for example, OR and Noisy-AND, in the interest of accuracy. A *disjunctive* (generative) causal relationship is one in which the probability of the effect increases at most linearly with the number of causes present, and a *conjunctive* relationship is one in which the probability effect increases more sharply once some number of causes ($n > 1$) is exceeded. Noisy-OR and noisy-AND functions are special cases of these and are used where appropriate.

3. Previous work using a similar device has referred to it as a ''blicket machine'' or ''blicket detector'' (Gopnik & Sobel, 2000; Sobel, Tenenbaum, & Gopnik, 2004). We chose to call it a ''blicketosity meter'' as this gave minimal cues to functional form, while ''blicket detector'' seems more consistent with an OR function.

4. We will represent events as a set of present or active prospective causes and the presence or absence of an effect, for example, if possible causes *A* and *B* are present and the effect is observed, the event can be written down as ({*a*,*b*},*e*) or, more concisely, as *AB+*.

5. Based on the suspicion that people would strongly favor deterministic functions, we considered using an inverse-exponential prior for the steepness—which assigns very low probability to values near zero—but abandoned it in favor of the exponential which can also strongly favor deterministic theories with the right parameter and is compatible with a wider range of beliefs, such as that the meter is acting randomly.

6. Hypothetically, a noisy-disjunctive relationship with a high failure rate coupled with a belief that almost all objects are blickets could lead to such an inference, but such an explanation is incompatible with ratings participants gave for *E*.

Acknowledgments

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Appendix: Materials for Experiment 5

The cover story for the dax blocks:

You will read about some rodents. Your goal is to figure out which of them are Daxes—some are and some are not. People cannot tell Daxes from non-Daxes, but cats can smell Daxes and are afraid of them. There are three rodents, called A, B, and C. The list below describes what happened when a cat was exposed to different rodents or groups of rodents.

The training block evidence in the Dax condition:

One time, the cat was exposed to A. The cat did not run away.
Another time, the cat was exposed to B. The cat did not run away.
Another time, the cat was exposed to C. The cat did not run away.
Another time, the cat was exposed to A and B. The cat did not run away.
Another time, the cat was exposed to A and C. The cat ran away.
Another time, the cat was exposed to B and C. The cat did not run away.

The questions people were asked in the Dax-condition training block:

Write down for rodents A, B, and C the probability that each is a Dax, using a number from 0 to 10 where 0 means you are absolutely certain it is not a Dax, 10 means you are absolutely certain it is a Dax, and 5 means it is equally likely to be a Dax as not.

Test block materials differed only in the specific evidence given.